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How Consumers Respond to Product Certification




I study how consumers respond to competing pieces of information that differ in their degree
of complexity and informativeness. In particular, I study the choice of refrigerators in the U.S.,
where a mandatory disclosure labeling program provides detailed information about energy cost,
and a certification labeling program provides a simple binary-star rating related to energy use. I
find that the coarse certification may help some consumers to pay attention to energy information,
but for others, it may crowd out efforts to process more accurate, but complex, energy information.
The effect of the certification on overall energy use is thus ambiguous.
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1. Introduction
In several markets, firms must disclose detailed information about certain dimensions of product
quality while being subject to certification programs that provide simpler information signals about
these same dimensions of quality. For instance, in the U.S., the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services publish a booklet with detailed information about Medicare Advantage contracts together
with a five-star rating that ranks these contracts along a single dimension. In the financial sec-
tor, publicly-traded firms disclose detailed financial and operating information, but credit rating
agencies also assign letter grades, a coarse summary of the default risk, on which investors rely
heavily.
In these various settings, consumers and investors are exposed to competing pieces of information
that differ in their degree of complexity and informativeness. A rationale to offer a certification
that provides a coarse summary of otherwise readily available information is that consumers may
differ in their ability to collect and process information. As a result, some consumers might prefer
to rely on simple and salient pieces of information, and forgo more accurate, but harder to process,
information. This paper investigates whether consumers trade off coarse and complex information.
My focus is on energy labels, which are important policies, in the U.S. and elsewhere, used to
induce consumers to purchase more energy efficient durables, and ultimately address externalities
associated with energy use. For instance, the Federal Trade Commission requires each appliance
model offered in the U.S. to prominently display the EnergyGuide label, which provides detailed
information about energy use and operating cost (Figure 1(b)). At the same time, appliance
manufacturers can also certify their products using the ENERGY STAR (ES) certification, a binary-
star rating that identifies the most energy-efficient models within a product class (Figure 1(a)). The
main rationale of the ES program is to offer a simple heuristic to compare products in the energy
dimension.
To answer whether consumers trade off energy information, I estimate a choice model using a
theory of rational attention allocation (Sims 2003).1 The model takes the form of an information
acquisition model (e.g., Stigler 1961; McCall 1965; Gabaix et al. 2006), where consumers select to
1Recently, Sallee (2014) also proposed a model of rational attention allocation to study why consumers might
be inattentive to energy information.
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rely on different pieces of information or even dismiss all energy information altogether. Using this
framework, I show that a coarse certification may not necessarily improve welfare if consumers are
heterogeneous in their costs of collecting and processing information. The ES certification may
help some consumers find energy-efficient products, but for other consumers, it may crowd out the
effort to collect and process more detailed and accurate information.
I estimate the model with microdata on the U.S. refrigerator market. I find that a fraction
of consumers value the ES certification well beyond the energy savings associated with certified
products. Others rely on a local measure of electricity cost and do not value the certification;
this fraction of consumers is more prevalent among the higher-income group. A large fraction
of consumers also appears to neither value the certification nor consider energy operating cost,
and this fraction is much larger for the lower-income group. Each latent type is identified by
specific substitution patterns that can be captured by relative movement in market shares. In
particular, the fact that the ES certification corresponds to a binary attribute whereas energy cost
is a continuous attribute reveals the fraction of consumers that are prone to rely on either pieces
of energy information.
The finding that a certification can act as a substitute for readily available detailed information
and that consumers may misperceive the information signal associated with certification is a cau-
tionary lesson about combining disclosure and certification policies. What is perceived to be the
strength of the ES program may be its weakness—the simple and salient ES label may divert some
consumers from relying on more complex, but accurate, energy information. In my policy simula-
tion, holding firms’ strategies constant, consumers would be slightly better off, by a few dollars, in
a world without certification.
The results are among the first estimates of the behavioral effects of energy labels using a
revealed preference approach combined with market-level data. Recently, Newell and Siikamäki
(2014) used an online survey with hypothetical choices and also found that the ES label has a
large impact on choices, and that consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the label goes beyond
the expected energy savings associated with the certification.2 Davis and Metcalf (2016) used
2Sammer and Wüstenhagen (2006) found similar results for the EU energy label. Consumers’ stated-WTP
for the letter grade “A” was also above the cost savings associated with the letter.
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a similar approach to study how consumers respond to the EnergyGuide label and an enhanced
label with local electricity costs. They found that most consumers tend to rely primarily on the
information presented on the label and do not seek further information. This more recent finding is
consistent with my results, which suggest that only a fraction of consumers rely on a local measure
of electricity cost. In the car market, Allcott (2013a) provided survey evidence that consumers may
misunderstand some pieces of information on fuel economy labels and have limited ability to perform
calculations to compute energy operating costs.3 My results complement these findings and have
important implications for the design of energy policies that target energy demand. Consumers’
inattention to energy efficiency or misperceptions of energy costs are an often-cited justification
for minimum standards. Recent empirical evidence has, however, been mostly confined to the car
market (e.g., Klier and Linn 2010; Li, Timmins and von Haefen 2009; Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer
2013; Allcott and Wozny 2013) and suggests that inattention to car operating costs may in fact
be modest. This article shows that the degree of inattention to energy costs in the appliance
market is highly heterogeneous, and only a fraction of consumers does not pay attention to this
attribute. As shown by Farhi and Gabaix (2015), quantifying heterogeneity in misperceptions is
important for the design of optimal policy accounting for behavioral bias. In the energy context,
heterogeneous misperceptions provide one argument in favor of a Pigouvian quantity instrument,
such as a standard, relative to a price instrument.
Outside the energy context several empirical studies have investigated certification programs
similar in nature to ES (Dranove and Jin 2010).4 My empirical analysis also complements the
structural demand models of Abaluck and Gruber (2011); Handel and Kolstad (2015); Ketcham,
Kuminoff and Powers (2016b); and Ketcham, Kuminoff and Powers (2016a), which aim to explicitly
study attention allocation and heuristics used in complex choice environments. My contribution is
to show that heterogeneity in the response to certification takes a particular form; the heterogeneity
patterns suggest different degrees of sophistication in the way consumers can collect and process
3Heinzle (2012) showed that the sign of the bias for expected energy operating costs is also ambiguous. In
one stated preference study, she found that consumers may tend to overestimate the energy operating costs
of televisions.
4For instance, Darden and McCarthy (2015) show how consumers respond to the star rating provided for
Medicare Advantage contracts. Jorion, Liu and Shi (2005) shows that the letter-grade used by rating agencies
impact stock prices and that this effect is much more pronounced after the adoption of the Fair Disclosure
regulation in 2003.
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information. From the broader industrial organization standpoint, this suggests that a coarse
certification that is highly valued—even by a small fraction of consumers—could facilitate product
differentiation and exacerbate market power.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a primer on energy labels
for the U.S. appliance market. Section 3 develops a framework to model how a coarse certification
can impact purchase decisions for energy-intensive durables. Section 4 gives an overview of the
data, and discusses sources of identification. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy and discusses
identification. Section 6 presents the results. The policy analysis is presented in Section 7, and
conclusions follow.
2. A Primer on Energy Labels for the Appliance Market
In the US appliance market, two different labeling schemes provide energy information to consumers:
the EnergyGuide and the ES certification. The EnergyGuide program was established in 1979 and
is managed by the Federal Trade Commission. The program covers most types of appliances and
several consumer electronics products. The main feature of the program is the requirement that each
product offered in the marketplace prominently displays a large yellow label with detailed technical
information about its annual energy use and operating cost. The content of the EnergyGuide label
has been revised several times since the inception of the program. In its most recent version (Figure
1(b)), the label displays the annual electricity (or gas) consumption of the product, an estimate of
the annual operating cost based on the national average price of energy, and a scale comparing this
cost with the costs of similar products.
Because the EnergyGuide label reports only an estimate of the operating cost based on a national
average price even though electricity prices vary widely across the United States, the label alone
does not perfectly inform consumers. Computing an accurate estimate of the local energy operating
cost thus remains a complex and costly task in the appliance purchasing decision. In addition to
taking the time to look at the EnergyGuide label and understand the various pieces of information,
consumers must also look up the local electricity price and perform mental calculations to compute
the operating cost over the lifetime of the product. The label can influence consumers via two
channels: it may lower information acquisition costs for crucial pieces of information related to
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energy operating costs and it may also increase the salience of energy efficiency as a dimension of
quality.
The salience of energy efficiency was the main rationale that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) invoked to establish the ES certification in 1992. The primary feature of the ES
program is a simple label that contains no technical information and is similar to a brand logo
(Figure 1(a)). Only products that meet a certain certification have the right to display the label.
The ES certification is voluntary and manufacturers ultimately decide whether to certify products
that meet the ES requirement. The ES label is displayed on certified appliances as a way to both
increase the salience of the energy efficiency attribute and to provide a simple heuristic to trade off
products in this dimension of product quality.
The ES certification requirement for appliances is binary.5 Under this system, the requirement
is defined relative to the federal minimum energy efficiency standard. For instance, before April
2008, a full-size refrigerator could be certified if it consumed at least 20% less electricity than the
minimum energy efficiency standard established for this refrigerator model.
A crucial feature of the ES program is that the certification requirements are revised periodi-
cally. The EPA revises the stringency of a requirement in a specific appliance category using various
criteria, such as the proportion of certified products offered on the market, the market shares, and
the availability of new technologies (McWhinney et al. 2005). The stringency of a requirement is
ultimately determined by the EPA upon consultation with different stakeholders, such as manufac-
turers, part providers, retailers, analysts, and environmental groups. The EPA usually announces
a revision one year in advance.
3. An Information Acquisition Model for Energy-Intensive Durables
This section develops a model of durable good purchase, which explicitly incorporates attention
allocation to different pieces of energy information. The goal is to develop a framework that can
be used to quantify how energy information affects consumers’ behavior and ultimately consumer
welfare. The model also provides a simple positive economic theory that explains why consumers
5In 2013, the EPA introduced a two-tier system in some product categories. In addition to the ES certifica-
tion, some products can also earn the “Most Efficient” certification. I focus on the binary system.
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may prefer to rely on coarse information in a setting where more detailed and accurate energy
information is readily available, or even dismiss all relevant information altogether.
Prior to collecting and processing information, knowledge about the energy cost of each product
j in a given region r at time t, denoted Cjrt, is considered to be imperfect. Imperfect information
stems from the fact that the energy operating cost of each product is not readily available. In order
to have to have an accurate estimate of Cjrt, consumers must search for information about local
electricity prices, present and future, and the expected lifetime of the product, and then perform
net-present value calculations.6 A consumer i can learn the value of Cjrt only by incurring a cost
Ki(ei), where ei represents the effort to collect and process energy information. Define I(ei) as the
consumer’s knowledge about energy costs for a given level of effort. The expected energy cost of
product j at the time of purchase is given by E[Cjrt|I(ei)].
Consumer i values product j, among J alternatives, as a function of its quality (δij), its price
(Pjrt), whether the product is ES certified or not at time t (Djt), and an idiosyncratic taste
parameter (εijrt):
(1) Uijrt = δij − ηPjrt − θE[Cjrt|I(ei)] + τDjt + εijrt.
A consumer’s purchasing decision is modeled as a two-step process. In the first step, the con-
sumer is uncertain about energy costs, the meaning of the certification (denoted S), and whether
a product is certified or not.7 A consumer observes the quality and the price for each appliance,
and then decides how much effort to expend collecting and processing energy information. I as-
sume that the consumer can choose one out of three effort levels. A consumer may collect and
process enough information to form accurate expectations about the energy costs associated with
each option, and thus makes a purchase decision perfectly informed (denoted e = I). In this case,
E[Cjrt|I(ei = I)] = Cjrt, where Cjrt is an accurate forecast of the local energy cost of product
6Note that even if the information provided by the EnergyGuide label was an unbiased estimate of lifetime
energy operating costs, which it is not, not all consumers would necessarily understand this information
perfectly. The model is thus also observationally equivalent to a model where consumers have tastes for
information complexity/simplicity. Consumers that have tastes for simpler information are modeled with
uninformative priors and high costs to collect and process information.
7I assume that the consumer is uncertain about whether a product is certified, even though it prominently
displays the ES label, due to possible psychological costs to detect whether or not a product is ES-certified.
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j. Alternatively, a consumer may only collect information related to the certification (denoted
e = ES). He will then learn the true meaning of the certification and which products are certified,
but not the exact energy cost of each option. For ES-certified products, the expected energy costs
are then E[Cjrt|Djt]. Finally, a consumer may decide not to update his priors, and thus remain
uncertain about energy costs, the meaning of the certification, and whether a product is certified
or not (noted e = U). In this case, prior beliefs are uninformative—that is, all options in the choice
set have the same expected energy cost ex ante: E[Cjrt|I(ei = U)] = C̄. In the second step, the
consumer chooses one of the J alternatives. When priors are uninformative, it is as if the consumer
dismisses all energy-related attributes altogether.
Prior to making a purchase, the consumer’s effort to collect and process information is given by







{Uijrt(δ, P, C,D, ε)}|I(e)
]
.
When consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the costs of collecting and processing energy
information, a fraction of the population will rely on energy costs, another will rely on the ES
certification, and others will dismiss all energy-related attributes.
In this framework, the certification influences consumers via two mechanisms. First, it can
be used as a heuristic to compare products in a binary manner along the energy dimension, and
thus partly informs about energy costs. If consumers rely on ES, instead of an accurate forecast
of energy cost, they would value certified products more based on their expected energy savings:
E[Cjrt|Djt = 1] − E[Cj′rt|Dj′t = 0]. According to this mechanism, the certification brings welfare
gains because it allows consumers to economize on information costs while it still provides some
information about energy use and cost. Consumers at the source of the welfare gains are the ones
that would not consider energy-related attributes if the certification were not in effect, but would
otherwise rely on the signal provided by the ES certification.
A second mechanism is the effect of the certification itself on preferences and perception of
quality. That is, consumers might value certified products beyond their expected energy savings
and might value the exact same appliance with and without the certification differently. There
are a number of reasons why the certification might have such an effect. ES products are often
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advertised as being environmentally friendly. Consumers might thus derive warm glow (Andreoni
1990) from purchasing certified products, respond to social norms, or experience social prestige.
Under this interpretation, the certification impacts how consumers experience the product and
provides a positive utility shock. It is also possible that consumers correlate certified products with
better quality and are subject to what marketers refer to as the halo effect (Boatwright, Kalra
and Zhang 2008). In this case, the certification provides an illusion of higher quality by indirect
association, and biases consumers. Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2008) refer to this
phenomenon as transference. Empirically, these explanations are hard to disentangle, but they are
important to recognize as they have different welfare implications.
In certain regions of the U.S., the ES certification also influences purchases via a third mecha-
nism, which is the effect of consumer rebates offered by various entities. Rebate programs have been
a popular approach used by local governments as well of electricity utilities to promote ES-certified
products. These rebates provide an explicit financial motivation to adopt ES products, in addition
to the informational effects.
4. Data and Environment
The primary data source consists of all transactions made at a large US appliance retailer during
2008-2011 in which a full-size refrigerator was bought. The retailer offers a large selection of
appliance models and has at least one brick-and-mortar store in each state in addition to a national
online store. For each transaction, I observe the date, the model of the refrigerator, detailed
attributes, the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP), the retailer’s price, the wholesale
price, the taxes paid, and the zip code of the store where the transaction was made. For a large
subset of transactions (≈ 40%), I also observe consumer demographics, such as household size,
income, education, homeownership, housing type, political orientation, and age of the head of
the household. This demographic information is transaction-specific and is collected by a data
aggregator. For the estimation, I use a large random sample of transactions for which demographic
information is available.
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I focus on refrigerators for two reasons. First, during the sample period, there were two events
that led to the decertification of ES refrigerators. Second, refrigerators are one of the few energy-
intensive durables for which utilization behavior has little impact on energy consumption. I can
thus infer energy operating costs accurately using engineering information and electricity prices,
and rule out utilization as a source of unobserved heterogeneity, which has important implications
on how to interpret the results.
They are four variables that are crucial for the identification of the empirical model: the ES
certification, prices, electricity costs, and rebates. Below I discuss the source of variation in each
of these variables. I provide additional details on the data and stylized facts in the appendix.
4.1. ENERGY STAR Certification
When a new certification requirement comes into effect, the EPA requires that manufacturers
and retailers remove the ES label from certified products that do not meet the more stringent
requirement. For products that display the ES logo on the EnergyGuide label, firms are also
required to clearly identify that these products are decertified by masking the logo. Using data
that cover the period before and after the revision in the standard, I observe the same refrigerator
model being sold at the same store with and without the ES certification. This variation identifies
how consumers value the ES certification, controlling for other product attributes.
During the sample period, the ES certification requirement for full-size refrigerators was revised
on April 28, 2008.8 Prior to this revision, ES refrigerators had to consume at least 15% less
electricity than the minimum energy efficiency standard; the revision set the stringency at 20%.
For the year 2008, there were 2,524 refrigerator models available in the whole US market, and
1,278 models lost their certification (Table 1). In the retailer’s sample, there are 1,483 models for
that year, with 674 models that were decertified. The large number of decertified models provides
good statistical power for identification, and more importantly covers all product classes, but it
brings two challenges. First, manufacturers and retailers adjust to the revision in certification by
introducing new models and removing decertified models. This is illustrated by Figure 4 (Appendix
8This corresponds to the effective date. The revision was announced exactly one year in advance by the
EPA.
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A), which shows that firms adjusted their product lines quickly, within one or two years, in response
to the revision in the certification requirement. Second, I do not observe the exact date that the
ES certification was corrected on each product. Although the retailer’s policy is to coordinate the
change in certification across all stores, and to implement the change close to the date mandated
by the EPA, I cannot ensure that all store managers complied with the policy on an exact date.
To control for the effects of product entries and exits, I construct trimester–zip code–specific
choice sets. For each refrigerator model, I identify the first and last trimesters for which a model
was sold at least once in a zip code,9 and I assume that consumers shopping at this location between
these two trimesters could purchase this particular refrigerator model.
As a robustness test, I also exploit a second decertification event that did not suffer from the
issues associated with the 2008 event. In January 2010, the EPA announced that 21 refrigerator
models from two different brands had been subject to an incorrect testing procedure, which resulted
in underestimation of their electricity consumption. The revised test confirmed that these models
did not meet the certification requirement and should be decertified. The sample contains 14 of
these models. Unlike the 2008 revision, this event came as a surprise for manufacturers and retailers.
The EPA also mandated that the retailers print new EnergyGuide labels and that they remove all
references to ES after the public announcement on January 20, 2010. This event thus induced a
sharp discontinuity in certification that rules out the effect of anticipation by firms. Moreover,
enforcement—or the threat of enforcement—by the EPA was likely to be more important given
the small number of models affected. One caveat is that this small sample of refrigerator models
may not be representative of the whole market. Table 1 shows that the prices of these models were
higher than average, which suggests that these models targeted higher-income households.
4.2. Prices
Throughout the sample period, the retailer had a national pricing policy and implemented large
and frequent variations in prices that were model specific. I exploit this high-frequency temporal
variation in prices to identify consumers’ sensitivity to prices.10 The identification argument here
9Most zip codes contain only one store.
10A second source of variation in prices comes from the two decertification events. As shown in Figure 5
(Appendix A), the prices of decertified models dipped below the prices of other models post-decertification.
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is similar to that of Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2012): abrupt variations in prices identify price
elasticities as long as they are not correlated with slow-moving trends in demand. I argue that
this exclusion restriction is likely to hold in the present context. The retailer relies on a high-low
pricing strategy where the timing and size of the price changes are set on a model-by-model basis.
As a result, the retailer’s prices are somewhat correlated within brands and periods of the year,
but there is substantial idiosyncratic variation left even when I account for those effects. This is
illustrated by Figure 2. Each panel plots the weekly variation in price for the nine most popular
models of a specific brand. The plain line corresponds to the median change in price relative to
the average price over the lifetime of the product, where the median is taken across zip codes.
The gray band identifies the 25th and 75th percentile of changes, also taken across zip codes. The
fact that these percentiles tend to be very close to the median for most weeks suggests that local
store managers follow the national pricing policy. The dashed line plots the median change in
price after controlling for brand-specific week-of-sample fixed effects. These fixed effects capture
seasonal as well as contemporaneous brand specific temporal shocks. Even after accounting for
those shocks, the large dispersion in prices persists. These patterns are not restricted to the most
popular models or to a specific brand. This significant randomness in how the retailer set prices
is consistent with the classical model of Varian (1980) where retailers play a mixed strategy that
consists of randomizing prices to screen between uninformed and informed consumers.
Although there is rich variation in prices, endogeneity might still be an issue, and as a result the
estimated coefficient on price will not be free of any biases. For instance, as discussed by Ackerberg
and Rysman (2005), product entries and exits might impact demand elasticities in an unexpected
manner. However, I will show that the coefficient on price is robust to various specifications.
More importantly, it is unlikely that the remaining sources of biases confound the identification of
the heterogeneity patterns in preferences for energy information, which is the main focus of the
empirical investigation.
The 2010 decertification had an especially dramatic effect—the prices of decertified models dropped sharply
just after the announcement by as much as 15%. Given that these abrupt changes in relative prices were




The energy operating cost of each refrigerator model that enters the choice model is the annual
electricity consumption reported by the manufacturer multiplied by the average electricity price of
the region where the purchase was made. I assume that consumers form time-unvarying expecta-
tions about electricity prices using the current local average price. The time-unvarying assumption
can be justified in two ways. First, electricity prices, unlike gasoline prices, have been very stable
over the sample period. For instance, between 2008 and 2010, the national average electricity price
remained virtually unchanged (Table 1). Second, time-unvarying expectations are consistent with
evidence in the car market suggesting that consumers tend to simply rely on the current gasoline
price to forecast future prices (Anderson et al. 2011).
Ito (2014) showed that households’ total energy usage responds to variations in average electricity
prices within California, which suggests that fairly local average electricity prices are the most
appropriate measure. Most online tools provided by the EPA and retailers to estimate energy
savings associated with ES, however, rely on a state average. I will report estimation results using
two different levels of aggregation: state and county average electricity prices. The structural
estimator, however, makes it clear that the behavioral responses to these two different measures
of average prices identify different primitives. For instance, when county average prices are used,
the model identifies the share of consumers that are sophisticated enough to collect and process
information about county-level electricity prices.
The main source of identification of the coefficient on electricity cost comes from the fact that
the same refrigerator models are being sold at stores located in different electric utility territories
at different points in time. This allows me to control for product fixed effects and demographic
information, and use cross-sectional and temporal variation in average electricity prices across
regions to identify the sensitivity to electricity prices.
4.4. Rebates
An important institutional feature of the US electricity market is that several electric utilities are
subject to regulations that incentivize them to promote energy efficiency measures to consumers.
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Several electric utilities have opted to offer rebate programs to encourage the adoption of energy-
efficient appliances. These rebate programs are all similar in nature. Consumers claim rebates
by filling out forms that must be submitted by mail or online. The purchased refrigerators must
meet a given energy efficiency criterion, which for most programs consists of the ES certification.
Financial incentives are thus one factor influencing the adoption of ES products, which I account for
in the demand model. A complete description of U.S. rebate programs is available in the database
of state incentives for renewables and efficiency (DSIRE). The number of active rebate programs
and the amount of the rebate offered by each program vary over time. In 2008, 87 utilities offered
a rebate program for ES refrigerators, and this number increased to 133 in 2010 (Table 1).
In addition to utility rebate programs, state governments also offered financial incentives for ES
appliances during the sample period. In 2010, as part of the stimulus effort, the federal government
allocated funds to all US states and territories to establish temporary rebate programs to encourage
the adoption of energy-efficient products. Each state had sovereignty over the design of its rebate
program, which led to important variations in the rebate amount across regions and time. During
the 2010-2011 period, 44 states offered rebates for ES-certified refrigerators. The average rebate
amount was $128, and the state rebates varied from $50 to $600. Some programs lasted for only
one day (e.g., Illinois and Texas); the longest-running program was in Alaska and lasted 639 days
(Houde and Aldy 2017).
In the estimation, the rebate amount offered to each consumer is the average rebate amount in
each county, which includes the utility and state rebates, when both are available. Utility rebates
vary annually and by county, whereas state rebates vary weekly.
5. Empirical Strategy
To obtain an econometric specification of the information acquisition model, I assume that the
information acquisition costs have an unobservable idiosyncratic component, νie, that is Type I
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extreme value distributed.11 For a level of effort, e, the cost for consumer i is given by
(3) Ki(e) = Ke + βeXi + νie,
where Xi is a vector of demographics, and the constant Ke and the vector βe are coefficients that
I estimate.





where Qirt(j) are the choice probabilities for product j, in zip code r, and week t. The choice prob-
abilities vary with observable demographic information; the subscript i thus refers to a particular
combination of demographic variables. Hirt(e) are the information acquisition (effort) choice prob-
abilities, and P eirt(j) are the product choice probabilities conditional on e. The alternative-specific
utilities, Uijrt, that enter P eirt(j) for each level of effort are
e = I : U Iijrt = −ηPjrt + ψRrt ×Djt − θCjrt + δij + εijrt
e = ES : UESijrt = −ηPjrt + ψRrt ×Djt + τESDjt − θESAV INGSrt ×Djt + δij + εijrt
e = U : UUijrt = −ηPjrt + δij + εijrt.
When e = I, consumers form a perfect forecast of the operating cost for each product in the
choice set by multiplying the annual electricity consumption of refrigerator j and the average
county electricity price in region r. When e = ES, the term ESAV INGSrt is the difference
between the average operating cost of ES and non-ES refrigerators, in region r at time t. The effect
of the certification is included for e = ES, which means that consumers can value certified models
beyond purely energy savings for the various reasons described above (e.g., warm glow or halo
effect). The effect of rebates is included for both e = I and e = ES. If consumers are uninformed
(e = U), they trade off refrigerators only with respect to prices and non-energy related attributes.
11The idiosyncratic component of the costs νie can also be interpreted as the idiosyncratic tastes for energy
information. This captures the fact that some consumers may understand well the meaning of the energy
labels, but may decide not to rely on them because they do not find this attribute important enough relative
to other attributes.
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The term δij is a product fixed effect that is consumer-specific. It consists of a dummy for each
product that captures all time-invariant attributes and a vector of product attributes interacted
with demographic information.12 Finally, I assume that that the idiosyncratic taste parameters, ε,
are Type I extreme value distributed and follow the same distribution across types.
Evaluating the expectation in (2) poses two challenges: it requires specifying consumers’ beliefs
about electricity costs and ES, and computing a large multidimensional integral. The latter is
particularly challenging for large choice sets, as in the present application (Table 1). The former
brings an identification issue given that I do not observe consumers’ beliefs at the moment they make
a purchase decision. This implies that the information acquisition costs that enter the effort choice
probabilities are not identified. I circumvent these two difficulties by using a flexible representation
of the expectation at different levels of effort. In particular, I approximate the expectation with
variables that capture the characteristics of the choice set faced by each consumer, which are related
to the decision of whether to process energy information.
As discussed by Sallee (2014), in a rational search model consumers might be inattentive to
energy efficiency if the variance in the value of other attributes is large relative to the variance in
electricity costs. The intuition is that the ex ante value of information increases with the variance
in beliefs. Therefore, if consumers have limited resources to spend on processing information, they
should allocate attention such that learning about attributes has the highest expected returns.






12For the estimation, education, household size, political orientation, and age of the head of the households
are interacted with attributes that are strongly correlated with energy efficiency, specifically size and door
design (top-freezer versus other designs).
17
where
Virt(e = I) =−KI − βIXi + γI1MeanElecrt + γI2V arElecrt + γI3NbModelsrt(6)
+ γI4V arPricert,
Virt(e = ES) =−KES − βESXi + γES1 MeanESrt + γES2 V arESrt + γES3 NbModelsrt
+ γES4 V arPricert,
Virt(e = U) = 0.
The variables MeanElecrt and V arElecrt are the mean and variance of electricity costs for all prod-
ucts offered in region r at time t, MeanESrt is the proportion of ES models offered, NbModelsrt is
the number of models in the choice set in a given region, and V arPricert is the variance in prices.
The estimation is performed via maximum likelihood. Additional details about the estimation
procedure are discussed in Appendix B.
5.1. Identification
The information acquisition model is a special case of a mixed logit with three discrete latent classes.
It can also be interpreted as a sorting model, where the effort choice probabilities capture why
consumers self-select to pay attention to a particular piece of energy information. The information
acquisition costs are not identified because consumer beliefs are not specified. My goal is to identify
the share of consumers in each latent class, and the behavioral parameters that enter the choice
probabilities for the purchase decision (η, θ, τES , and ψ).
The latent classes capture unobserved heterogeneity in the valuation of energy efficiency. As it
is customary in discrete choice models, events that induce specific substitution patterns identify
heterogeneity. In the present application, the coarseness of the certification requirement and the
continuous nature of the information related to electricity costs each yields different substitution
patterns allowing me to identify each latent class. To illustrate, consider a market with only three
refrigerator models, all with the same quality, but with different levels of energy consumption.
Figure 3 represents the location of each refrigerator model in the quality-energy efficiency char-
acteristics space, before and after the revision in the ES standards, for three types of consumers.
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Panels (a) and (d) represent the location of the refrigerator models in the quality-energy cost char-
acteristics space for consumers that are fully informed about energy costs. For this consumer type,
products are located at a different address in the characteristics space. How market shares will
vary for a relative change in prices will then be a function of the distance between products due to
the difference in electricity costs. Note that for this consumer type, a revision in the ES standard,
illustrated on Panel (d) by the line s, should not influence the substitution patterns. Panels (b)
and (e) represent the location of the same models in the quality-ES characteristics space. This
corresponds to a graphical representation of consumers that rely on the ES certification to account
for the energy efficiency attribute. These consumers perceive ES refrigerators as perfect substitutes.
The revision in the ES standard impacts this perception (Panel (e)). For this consumer type, the
Independence of the Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) hypothesis should hold within the class of products
that are certified (and with similar quality). Finally, for consumers that do not account for the
energy efficiency attribute at all, Panels (c) and (f), all products are located at the same address in
the characteristics space and are perceived as perfect substitutes. The IIA hypothesis should hold
for all products with similar quality, irrespective of their location in the energy efficiency dimension.
In the present model, the consumer-specific quality dummies, δij , fix the location of each product
in the characteristics space. Large and frequent variation in prices, the two decertification events,
product entry and exit, and variation in electricity prices and rebates all provide the source of
variation to induce substitution patterns that are specific to each latent class as described above.
The relative movement in market shares in response to each of those variables, controlling for
quality in the non-energy dimension, identify the latent classes. For instance, suppose that for a
combination of demographic i, the relative market shares for products j and k for that demographic
group, denoted σij and σik respectively, are not impacted by variation in electricity costs, but
respond to change in certification for say product k; this would identify the share of consumers
responding to the ES certification, but not electricity costs. The discrete choice model approach
allows me to compare a large number of products for different demographic groups at once, but it
is still the relative movement in market shares for each pair of products, for a given demographic
group i, that identifies the model.
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In sum, the discrete and binary nature of the ES certification allows me to distinguish the share
of consumers that trade off energy efficiency using the certification from consumers that use a more
continuous measure, such as an estimate of electricity costs. For consumers that dismiss all energy
information, only prices and quality will matter in their decision, and thus impact market shares.
6. Results
Before presenting the results from the information acquisition model, I present the results from a
simple conditional logit. The conditional logit serves as a benchmark to characterize the preferences
of an average consumer for various income groups and to investigate the sources of variation in the
data.
I perform the estimation of both the information acquisition model and the conditional logit
on three large samples of transactions randomly drawn from each income tertile.13 I sample from
the set of transactions that contain complete demographic information. Moreover, I consider only
transactions made by homeowners living in single family housing units that bought no more than one
refrigerator during the period 2008-2011. The rationale to consider this restricted set of transactions
is to select households that are the most likely to pay for their electricity bills. The estimation
samples thus rule out heterogeneity in sensitivity to energy costs due to the split incentive problem
(Blumstein et al. 1980), that is, the fact that some consumers of energy-intensive durables do not
pay for energy costs (e.g., contractors or some renters).
6.1. Conditional Logit
The alternative-specific utility for the conditional logit is:
(7) Uijrt = τDjt − ηPjrt + ψRrt ×Djt − θCjrt + δj + εijrt
where the variable Cjrt is the annual electricity cost of operating product j based on expectations in
week t in zip code r. Unless otherwise specified, I compute Cjrt using the county average electricity
13Income information is coded with a categorical variable that takes nine values. The lowest tertile corre-
sponds to annual household income of less than $50,000. The second tertile corresponds to household income
equal to or greater than $50,000, but less than $100,000. The third tertile corresponds to income equal to
or greater than $100,000.
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price for the year that week t belongs to. Pjrt is the weekly retail price, which includes all the local
sales taxes, and Rrt is the average rebate amount offered in zip code r in week t, which includes
utility and state rebate programs. Djt is a dummy variable that takes the value one if product
j is certified at time t and zero otherwise. The variables δj and εijrt denote, respectively, the
product fixed effects, and the idiosyncratic taste parameters, which are assumed to be i.i.d. and
type I extreme value distributed. The choice probabilities do not include an outside option (no
purchase or purchase at other stores) because the policy analysis focuses on how energy information
influences which product to purchase at a given store, not the timing or location of the decision.
Table 2 presents the estimates obtained with various specifications of the conditional logit for
the three income groups. For all models, robust standard errors clustered at the zip code level are
reported. Model 1 is the simplest and only controls for product fixed effects.
The coefficient on price (η) is negative and large in absolute value. The own-price elasticity
evaluated at the mean price ($1,300) is -5.41, -4.75, and -4.16 for the lowest, medium, and highest
income tertiles, respectively.
The coefficient on the ES dummy (τ) is positive and statistically significant for all three income
groups. The ratio of τ and the marginal utility of income, τ/η, corresponds to the marginal
willingness to pay (WTP) for the ES certification itself. The WTP is modest and increasing with
income. It is $30.0 for the low-income tertile, $44.6 for the medium-income tertile, and $56.9 for
the high-income tertile.
For all three income groups, the coefficient on electricity cost (θ) is negative and significant, but
implies that consumers steeply discount operating energy costs. Comparing θ with the coefficient
on price informs us about the extent to which consumers trade electricity costs with the purchase
price. In Appendix C, I show that, under various assumptions about the lifetime of a refrigerator,
consumers’ expectations of future electricity prices, and depreciation, the implicit discount rate
that rationalizes consumers’ decisions is as high as 34% for the lowest-income group, but drops to
17% for the medium-income group, and 10% for the highest-income group.
Finally, the coefficient on ES rebates (ψ) is positive and small, but is statistically significant
only for the two lowest-income tertiles. If we were able to observe whether a consumer claimed
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a rebate R, and there were no hassle costs associated with claiming a rebate, the coefficient on
rebates would exactly match the coefficient on price—that is, it would be equal to the marginal
utility of income. In the present application, the ratio of ψ/η is 21%, 11%, and 5% from the lowest
to the highest income group, respectively. Lower-income households thus respond more to rebates.
The above results are robust to various alternative specifications. Model 2 is similar to Model 1,
but distinguishes between the two decertification events. I include a dummy for the ES certification
that takes a value of zero if a product lost its certification in 2008, and a second ES dummy that
takes a value of zero if a product lost its certification in 2010. The estimates suggest positive
certification effects, but the 2010 estimates are larger relative to 2008. For 2008, the WTP for
the certification itself is still positively correlated with income levels, but this pattern does not
hold for 2010. Comparing the estimates from the two events should be done, however, with the
caveat that only a small number of products from specific brands were decertified in 2010. They
are, therefore, not representative of the whole market, and some income groups might value those
products more. Moreover, EPA’s enforcement—or the threat of enforcement—of the decertification
likely differed in the two cases. Nonetheless, the fact that the estimates from the 2010 event are
large and significant is reassuring given that these estimates are unlikely to be biased by firms’
product line decisions in anticipation of the decertification.
Model 3 includes demographic information interacted with product attributes with the goal of
capturing regional or temporal differences in consumer demographics correlated with operating
costs and rebate programs. Given that I use cross-sectional variation to identify the coefficients on
electricity cost and rebates, a concern is that the behavioral responses to electricity costs or rebates
are confounded by region-specific preferences for attributes correlated with energy use. This could
occur if, for instance, high-income consumers that prefer large refrigerators live disproportionately
in regions with low electricity prices. Consumer sorting due to short-term substitution might also
be an issue, especially for the identification of the coefficient on rebates, which were generous, but
short-lived in some regions. In Model 3, I thus include a vector of product attributes strongly
correlated with refrigerator energy use, namely, size, ice-maker option, and door design interacted
with the rich set of demographics available: household size, income, education, political orientation,
and age of the head of the household. The estimates of Model 3 closely replicate the ones of Model
22
1, suggesting that the cross-sectional and temporal variations in electricity costs and rebates are
not confounded by preference heterogeneity.
I present additional robustness tests in the appendix (Tables 5-7). In the previous section, I have
argued that product-specific weekly variation in prices can be exploited to identify the coefficient
on price and I have shown that, even after controlling for brand-week fixed effects, substantial
idiosyncratic variation remains in the price time series of each product. Model 4 confirms this.
Including brand-week fixed effects has little impact on the coefficient on prices or other coefficients.
The fact that the coefficient on the ES certification remains unchanged under this specification also
suggests that the behavioral response captured by the 2010 decertification event is not influenced
by a negative perception of the brands impacted by the event. Model 5 shows that using state
electricity prices instead of county averages does not impact the implicit discount rate, and this
is true for the three income groups. In Model 6, I flexibly control for product age by including a
dummy variable for each quarter of the year that a product has been on the market. The goal is
to address the concern that the price variation might be correlated with the age (shelf life) of a
product or that the age of decertified products might be systematically correlated if manufacturers
and retailers perfectly anticipated the 2008 decertification and made product lines based on this.
For all three income groups, product age has little impact on the coefficient on price, whereas the
coefficient on the ES certification changes by only a few percentage points. The last robustness
test consists of investigating the effect of the consideration set. In the previous specifications, I
have assumed that consumers were choosing among all full-size refrigerators offered by the retailer
in a given zip code. Refrigerator size, however, is likely to restrict some consumers, as a kitchen
is commonly designed to accommodate a refrigerator of a certain size. In Model 7, I thus create
consumer-specific consideration sets based on the size of the refrigerators consumers bought. In
particular, I assume that consumers were considering only products within +/- 5 cubic feet of the
overall refrigerator capacity that they ended up purchasing. This criterion cut the choice set by
half, on average. Doing so has little impact on most estimates, with the exception of the coefficient
on electricity cost. In this model, the coefficient is smaller (in absolute terms), which suggests
higher implicit discount rates.
23
Overall, the main results from the simplest specification (Model 1) are robust to various alterna-
tive specifications. For all three income groups, both the ES certification and electricity cost impact
purchase decisions, although the coefficients on electricity cost imply large implicit discount rates.
The exact values of the implicit discount rates are sensitive to the definition of the consideration
set, but heterogeneity across income groups follows intuitive and robust patterns. Consumers in
the lowest income tertile value the ES certification less, respond more to ES rebates, and have a
higher implicit discount rate relative to higher-income consumers.
6.2. Information Acquisition Model
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the information acquisition model for each income group.
Comparing the estimates of the coefficient on electricity cost (θ) of the information acquisition
model with the conditional logit (Table 2) shows the importance of accounting for heterogeneity in
consumer sophistication. Whereas the conditional logit model suggests a large undervaluation of
energy efficiency, this phenomenon has a more nuanced interpretation in the information acquisition
model. For consumers that rely on electricity costs (e = I), the implicit discount rate is lower and
on par with other investment decisions. It is 7.5%, 7.9%, and 2.8% for the first, second, and third
income tertiles, respectively. The fact that the implicit discount rate for higher-income households
is smaller relative to the other two income groups is particularly interesting as it suggests lower
short-term borrowing costs for this income group.
The latent probabilities that classify consumers into different information types suggest that the
share of perfectly informed consumers is increasing with income. For the first income tertile, it is
34%, on average.14 This share increases to 50% for the second income tertile, and 56% for the third
tertile. The share of uninformed consumers follows the opposite pattern. It is 45%, 41%, and 27%
for the first, second, and third income tertiles, respectively. Finally, the share of consumers that
relies primarily on ES is relatively constant across the three groups (21%, 10%, and 17%). For this
last consumer type, the willingness to pay for the ES certification is very high. It is $163 for the first
income tertile, $422 for the second tertile, and $430 for the third tertile. These revealed preferences
14The latent probabilities that determine consumer sorting into different types is a function of demographics
and characteristics of the choice set. The probability that a consumer is of a given type thus varies across
consumers and regions. The average reported in Table 3 is taken over the whole population.
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WTP estimates are consistent with the stated preferences estimates of Ward et al. (2011), which
range from $250 to $349 for refrigerators. In my structural model, the certification effect captures
the willingness to pay for certified products that goes beyond the average monetary value of the
energy savings associated with ES products. These high values of the WTP for the certification
itself thus imply that the certification enacts strong preferences or biases that lead to the adoption
of ES products. Whether ES is a useful heuristic from a welfare standpoint is unclear. The large
WTP for the certification itself is puzzling and could suggest that consumers might have a biased
perception of the overall quality of certified products.
Relative to the conditional logit (Table 2), the coefficients on rebate increase, are positive, and
become significant for the lower-income groups. Again, this shows the importance of accounting
for heterogeneity. Consumers in the two lower-income groups respond more to rebates, which is
consistent with the idea that, relative to richer households, they may be more willing to incur the
hassle costs of claiming a rebate.
The coefficients that enter the latent probabilities show interesting patterns. Households with a
graduate degree are more likely to be classified as fully informed. Older households of smaller size
are more likely to be fully informed or rely on the ES certification. Democrats are more likely to
be uninformed. As predicted by a rational model of search (Sallee 2014), a large variance in prices
increases inattention to energy efficiency. Consistent with the theory, in regions with high electricity
costs, consumers are also more likely to fully process energy information as the opportunity cost of
dismissing this piece of information is higher. As expected, a larger proportion of ES models also
increases the probability that consumers use ES as a decision heuristic.
The present framework provides a number of interesting insights regarding the existence of a
so-called Energy Efficiency Gap (Jaffe and Stavins 1994), the apparent fact that consumers tend
to underinvest in energy saving technologies. First, it is attributable to the existence of a share of
uninformed consumers that dismiss the energy efficiency attribute altogether and this share is larger
for lower-income households. Second, in this particular context, credit constraints do not seem to
be a main barrier to adoption—for the share of consumers that value future electricity costs, the
discount rate is low, although low income households have a higher discount rate. Finally, the effect
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of the ES certification is controversial. The large WTP for the certification itself may imply that
some consumers invest too much in energy saving technologies.
7. The Value of Energy Information
In this section, I develop a framework based on the information acquisition model that can be used
to quantify the welfare effects of various information-based policies. As an illustration, I focus on
showing how removing the ES certification impacts consumer welfare.
According to the information acquisition model, for consumers that do not fully process energy
information, there is a discrepancy between the electricity costs they believe they would pay and
the electricity costs they effectively pay. My welfare measure is an extension of Leggett’s formula15
that accounts for consumers sorting into different groups based on their costs of collecting and
processing energy information.
To start with, I make the following two assumptions. First, if e = I, decision utility equals
experienced utility. Second, the costs of collecting and processing information, Ki(e), do not impact
experienced utility. The first assumption implies that perfectly informed consumers have unbiased
beliefs. The second assumption implies that the costs of collecting and processing information are
perceptual in nature and do not impact welfare.16
Under these assumptions, the experienced utility is given by
(8) U Iijrt = δij − ηPjrt + ψRrt ×Djt − θCjr + εijrt.
Whether the effect of the ES certification should be included in Equation 8 can be debated. The
high estimates for the willingness to pay for the certification could reflect a behavioral bias, e.g.,
15I would like to thank Nick Kuminoff for pointing out to me the existence of Leggett (2002)’s work and a
very helpful discussion about it. Recently, Allcott (2013b); Ketcham, Kuminoff and Powers (2016b,a) also
specifically addressed issues of welfare measurement with consumers’ biases using a framework similar to
Leggett (2002).
16Under this interpretation of the information acquisition costs, the choice model is consistent with the model
of tax salience of Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) and the internality concept of Allcott, Mullainathan and
Taubinsky (2014).
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the halo effect, or the manifestation of preferences. I use a lower bound on the change in consumer
surplus by considering a measure that simply excludes the certification effect.17
In Appendix E, I show that for a policy change P → P̃, the compensating variation (CV) for
a specific income group differs from the standard expression for the multinomial logit (Small and
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UES,Uij ), which have an intuitive interpretation. For the case where e = ES (respectively, e = U),
the correction term represents the expected difference between experienced and decision utility for
relying on the ES certification (respectively for being uninformed) instead of a measure of local
electricity cost. Second, the welfare measure is a weighted sum of the differences in welfare for the
three consumer types, where the weights are the latent probabilities, He. This weighted sum arises
because I do not observe consumers sorting into different types due to unobserved heterogeneity in
information acquisition costs.
I can also decompose the welfare measure to evaluate the value of information for each consumer
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which simply corresponds to the opportunity cost of relying on the certification. A similar expres-
sion can be used to estimate the value of energy information for uninformed consumers (e = U).
I present a counterfactual scenario where the goal is to quantify the value of energy information
provided by the ES certification, from the standpoint of consumers alone, on an equilibrium path.
In order to do so, I simulate the choice probabilities with and without the ES certification holding
constant the strategies of the firms—namely, the product line and pricing decisions. I also set all
ES rebates to zero, which rules out the effect of monetary incentives and allows me to isolate the
information effects associated with the certification. This simulation exercise thus illustrates how
different heuristics to account for energy information benefit or hurt consumers in a given choice
environment. For instance, when facing a particular choice set, are consumers better off relying
17Given that the coefficient τES is large, excluding this term from the experienced component of utility will
underestimate how much utility consumers derive from the certification, hence the lower bound.
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on detailed energy information, relying on the coarse ES certification, or completely dismissing
energy information? I also consider a second scenario where I set the certification effect (τES) to
zero to show the sensitivity of the results with respect to this parameter. For both scenarios, I
simulate the choice probabilities during the 2009-2011 period holding constant the products offered
and the prices. I exclude the year 2008 in order to focus on a time period where the ES certification
requirement did not undergo a large revision. During the 2009-2011 period, all certified products
had to be at least 20% more energy efficient than the federal minimum standard.
Table 4 reports various metrics for the three income groups and the two scenarios. The first row
of Table 4 shows the CV associated with the ES certification.18 Across all three income groups and
both scenarios, the CV estimates are small, but negative. This means that consumers are slightly
worse off in a market with certification. This is a surprising result, but it can be explained by two
effects.
First, the estimates of the value of information for the ES type and the uninformed type (second
and third rows of Table 4) help explain the result. Focusing on the first scenario, the value of
information for the ES type is larger than the value of information for the uninformed type. This
means that consumers would be better off dismissing energy information altogether than using a
decision heuristic that relies on the ES certification. This result is driven by the large certification
effect, τES , which effectively acts as a bias. If I set τES = 0, the estimates of the value of information
for the ES type are then smaller, albeit by at most 17 cents, across all three income groups, relative
to the uninformed type. There are two important conclusions here. First, if the large certification
effect is treated as a phenomenon that impacts decision utility, but does not enter experienced
utility, it is at the source of a welfare loss. Second, even once I exclude this term from decision
utility, the certification has a very low information value in equilibrium. That is, once product
18To compute the CV measure, the market without the ES certification corresponds to the baseline policy
scenario P, and the market with the ES certification corresponds to the policy change scenario P̃. The CV
is thus the reduction in income that a consumer would be willing to accept in a market with certification to
be as well off as in a market without certification. Therefore, a positive estimate for the CV implies that the
certification is welfare improving, because consumers would be willing to pay a share of their income to be
subject to the certification. A negative value for the CV implies the opposite.
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line and pricing decisions are realized, consumers would be as well off ignoring energy information
altogether as differentiating products based on their ES certification.19
The second reason why the CV estimates on Table 4 are negative is the crowding-out effect
induced by the certification. Focusing on Scenario 2, the value of information for the ES type
is slightly smaller than for the uninformed type. If the fraction of consumers that are perfectly
informed were to stay constant with and without certification, the CV would then be unambiguously
positive. However, in a market without certification, the fraction of perfectly informed consumers
should always be larger than in a market with certification, which I refer to as the crowding-out
effect (see proof in Appendix D). That is, a coarse certification has the unintended consequence of
reducing the fraction of perfectly informed consumers in the market. In the present case, removing
the certification leads to an increase in the share of perfectly informed consumers. This effect
is large enough that it compensates for the small loss in the value of information caused by the
removal of the certification.
Overall, the welfare metrics suggest very small effects. Note that those small effects arise even
though the magnitude of consumers’ misperceptions are large. As shown by the correction terms,
consumers dismiss a large component of the lifetime cost of a refrigerator if they rely on ES, or
even more if they dismiss energy information. In equilibrium, however, those misperceptions have
little impact on consumer welfare. Again, the nature of the choice set offered in equilibrium plays a
crucial role here. Given that manufacturers clearly respond to the certification, there is very little
benefit for consumers to make a tangible effort to account for energy information.
8. Conclusions
I show that consumers respond to the ES certification, a coarse summary of readily available
information about appliance energy use. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the way
consumers respond to different pieces of energy information. The heterogeneity patterns suggest
that the coarse certification acts as a substitute for more detailed and accurate information, and
19In Houde (2013), I show that the fact that a fraction of consumers value the certification highly explains
why firms offer a large share of certified products in equilibrium and products bunch closely at the ES
requirement (Figure 4, Appendix A).
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vice versa. In particular, consumers that rely on the ES certification have a large WTP for the
ES certification that goes beyond the value of expected energy savings associated with certified
products. This suggests that the coarse ES certification is more akin to a brand that some consumers
value highly without knowing the precise meaning of the ES certification requirement. Finally, the
heterogeneity patterns also suggest that there is a large share of consumers that do not consider
energy information in their appliance purchasing decisions, and this share of consumers is larger
among lower-income households.
The structural model shows that for observed prices the certification makes consumers slightly
worse off. The welfare loss first arises because I consider that the high WTP for the ES certification
corresponds to various biases, i.e., the certification impacts the decision utility, but does not affect
the experienced utility. The ES certification also crowds out perfectly informed consumers—a sec-
ond source of the welfare loss. Together, these results suggest that we should pay careful attention
to the design of certification programs in the energy, medical, financial, and food sectors. A cer-
tification that provides a coarse information signal might be more salient, but misunderstood by
consumers. Additional concerns arise when certification and disclosure programs interact. In such
cases, providing simple and salient information might divert attention away from more complex,
but accurate information.
A natural way to improve the ES certification would be to provide a finer information signal,
perhaps with a letter-grade ranking as it is currently done in Europe.20 Another alternative to
a coarse certification is to design policies that impact the choice set offered by manufacturers (or
retailers) without distorting the informational signal provided to consumers. How the effects of
a manufacturers’ tax credit targeted toward energy efficiency compare to a certification deserves
further consideration.
20This type of ranking might, however, still confuse consumers. For instance, Alberini, Filippini and Bareit
(2014) studied a letter-grade system ranking vehicles from A to G, and found a price premium for A-rated
vehicles only, which suggests that consumers were not able to process the entire ranking scale.
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9. Figures
(a) ES label (b) EnergyGuide label
Figure 1. Energy Labels for the U.S. Appliance Market
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Figure 2. Price Variation for the Four Most Popular Models of Brand A
Notes: The plain (red) line shows the median weekly price change for a particular model.
The weekly price change was computed for all zip codes where the model was offered. The
median is taken across zip codes. The gray band identifies the 25th and 75th percentiles of
the weekly price changes. The dashed (blue) line is the median weekly price change after
removing the effect of brand dummies interacted with week-of-sample fixed effects. The




Figure 3. (a) Consumers with expectations about energy costs for each
model. s represents the ES standard. (b) Consumers that rely on ES. D = 1
models certified ES, zero otherwise. (c) Consumers that dismiss energy costs.




Table 1. Summary Statistics
2008 2010
Choice Set
# of Refrigerator Models, US Market 2,524 1,496
# of Decertified Refrigerator Models, US Market 1,278 21
# of Refrigerator Models, Retailer’s Sample 1,483 1,174
# of Decertified Refrigerator Models, Retailer’s Sample 674 14
Average Size of Choice Set (Store-Trimester) 99 92
SD Size of Choice Set (Store-Trimester) 44 37
Price and Duration
Avg Retail Price $1,325 $1,411
SD Retail Price Offered $639 $693
Avg Weekly Price Change 11% 15%
Avg Duration Between Price Change (weeks) 1.4 3.1
Avg Retail Price ENERGY STAR $1,426 $1,368
Avg Retail Price Non-ENERGY STAR $1,240 $1,472
Avg Retail Price Decertified Model $1,416 $2,468
Rebate
# of Utility Rebate Programs for ENERGY STAR Refrigerators 87 133
# of State Rebate Programs for ENERGY STAR Refrigerators 0 44
Avg Rebate Offered $48 $104
SD Rebate Offered $54 $144
Electricity Costs: US Refrigerators
Avg Elec. Price (County) ($/kWh) 0.113 0.113
Min Elec. Price ($/kWh) 0.03 0.03
Max Elec. Price ($/kWh) 0.420 0.368
Avg Elec. Consumption (kWh/y) 520 506
Avg Elec. Consumption ENERGY STAR (kWh/y) 500 501
Avg Elec. Consumption Decertified ENERGY STAR (kWh/y) 520 547
Avg Elec. Consumption Non-ENERGY STAR (kWh/y) 568 525
Notes: The sample consists of all transactions for which a refrigerator was bought at the retailer.
The number of full-size refrigerator models for the whole United States was obtained from the US


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Information Acquisition Model
Income Income Income
<$50,000 ≥$50,000 & ≥$100,000
<$100,000
Behavioral Parameters Purchase Decision:
Retail Price (η) -0.413∗∗∗ (0.0002) -0.362∗∗∗ (0.0001) -0.317∗∗∗ (0.0002)
ENERGY STAR τES 0.674∗∗∗ (0.001) 1.528∗∗∗ (0.002) 1.365∗∗∗ (0.080)
Rebate (ψ) 0.145∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.090∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.033∗∗∗ (0.0003)
Elec. Costs (θ) -4.003∗∗∗ (0.009) -3.408∗∗∗ (0.048) -4.429∗∗∗ (0.004)
KI 1.357∗∗∗ (0.0004) 0.974∗∗∗ (0.004) 2.125∗∗∗ (0.001)
KES -6.441∗∗∗ (0.023) -5.011∗∗∗ (0.025) -3.056∗∗∗ (0.070)
Educ: College (βI) -0.122∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.691∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.303∗∗∗ (0.012)
Educ: Graduate (βI) 1.717∗∗∗ (0.031) 2.045∗∗∗ (0.026) 1.197∗∗∗ (0.032)
FamSize (βI) -0.204∗∗∗ (0.0001) -0.318∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.049∗∗∗ (0.007)
Age (βI) 0.092∗∗∗ (0.0002) 0.084∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.001)
Political: Democrats (βI) -1.284∗∗∗ (0.022) -1.899∗∗∗ (0.034) -0.221∗∗∗ (0.025)
Political: Others (βI) -1.920∗∗∗ (0.008) -1.338∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.200 (0.018)
Educ: College (βES) -0.271∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.012 (0.007) 0.105∗∗∗ (0.007)
Educ : Graduate(βES) -0.453∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.843∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.676∗∗∗ (0.028)
FamSize (βES) -0.193∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.091∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.232∗∗∗ (0.014)
Age (βES) 0.063∗∗∗ (0.0002) 0.045∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.024∗∗∗ (0.001)
Political: Democrats (βES) -0.255∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.421∗∗∗ (0.015) -0.045 (0.024)
Political: Others (βES) -0.578∗∗∗ (0.0003) -0.469∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.018 (0.025)
mean-ElecCost 0.107∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.075∗∗ (0.001) 0.105∗∗∗ ( 0.008)
var-ElecCost 0.006∗∗∗ (0.00002) -0.101∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.026∗∗∗ ( 0.001)
# Models (γI) 0.007∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.012∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.004 ∗∗∗ (0.0004)
Variance Price (γI) -1.003∗∗∗ (0.004) -0.729∗∗∗ (0.012) -0.390∗∗∗ (0.004)
Proportion-Estar 2.837∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.975∗∗∗ (0.001) 2.324∗∗∗ (0.114)
# Models (γES) -0.006∗∗∗ (0.0002) -0.001∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
Variance Price (γES) 0.316∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.211∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.109∗∗∗ (0.006)
Interpretation
Own-Price Elasticity -5.36 -4.70 -4.12
Implicit Discount Rate 0.08 0.08 0.03
WTP ES Label ($) 163.43 422.22 430.33
Prob. Taking Rebate 0.35 0.25 0.10
Q(e = I) 0.34 0.50 0.56
Q(e = ES) 0.21 0.10 0.17
Q(e = U) 0.45 0.41 0.27
# Obs. 46,097 45,487 45,249
LLE 188,088 194,394 195,969
Notes: Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗ (p < 0.01), ∗∗∗ (p <
0.001). Prices, rebates, and electricity costs measured in hundreds of dollars. Average price of
$1,300 used to compute own-price elasticity. Refrigerator lifetime of 18 years used to compute
implicit discount rate.
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Table 4. The Value of Energy Information
Income Income Income
<$50,000 ≥$50,000 & ≥$100,000
<$100,000
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
τES = 0 τES = 0 τES = 0
CV ($) -4.7 -1.7 -5.1 -0.6 -11.8 -2.9
V OIe=ES ($) 28.2 15.9 57.1 13.0 70.2 23.1
V OIe=U ($) 15.9 15.9 13.2 13.2 23.3 23.3
Mispercetions, e = ES ($) -123.5 0.5 -388.1 -5.6 -396.7 -12.8
Mispercetions, e = U ($) -592.0 -592.0 -605.7 -605.7 -925.5 -925.5
Notes: To compute the CV measure, the baseline policy scenario, P, is the market without certification, and the policy
change scenario, P̃, is the market with certification. A negative estimate for the CV implies that the certification
reduces consumer welfare. For all income groups, the various estimates of CV are small and negative.
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Newell, Richard G, and Juha Siikamäki. 2014. “Nudging Energy Efficiency Behavior:
The Role of Information Labels.” Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource
Economists, 1(4): 555–598.
Sallee, James M. 2014. “Rational Inattention and Energy Efficiency.” Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 57(3): 7.
Sammer, Katharina, and Rolf Wüstenhagen. 2006. “The influence of eco-labelling on con-
sumer behaviour–Results of a discrete choice analysis for washing machines.” Business Strategy
and the Environment, 15(3): 185–199.
Sims, Christopher A. 2003. “Implications of Rational Inattention.” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 50(3): 665–690.
Small, Kenneth A., and Harvey S. Rosen. 1981. “Applied Welfare Economics with Discrete
Choice Models.” Econometrica, 49(1): 105–130.
Stigler, George J. 1961. “The Economics of Information.” Journal of Political Economy,
69(3): 213–225.
Varian, Hal R. 1980. “A Model of Sales.” The American Economic Review, 70(4): 651–659.
Ward, David O., Christopher D. Clark, Kimberly L. Jensen, Steven T. Yen, and
Clifford S. Russell. 2011. “Factors Influencing Willingness-To-Pay for the ENERGY STAR
Label.” Energy Policy, 39(3): 1450–1458.
41
Appendixes
Appendix A. Data Preparation and Additional Stylized Facts
A.1. Product Line Decisions
The following figure shows the location of each refrigerator model offered on the market during
the period 2006-2011 in the size and energy use dimensions of the product space. Each figure
corresponds to a different refrigerator design. I distinguish top-freezer, bottom-freezer, and side-
by-side refrigerators. The first takeaway is that products tend to bunch at the minimum and ES
standards. Moreover, the revision of the ES standard led to the introduction of new models. Models
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Figure 4. Choice Set Full-Size Top-Freezer Refrigerators: 2006-2010
Notes: Each dot represents a particular refrigerator model that was present on the market in
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Figure 5. Prices Around Decertification Events
Notes: Each panel displays average normalized weekly prices, with 95% confidence intervals,
of refrigerators that belong to different efficiency classes. The top panel shows that the price
of decertified models slightly decreased after the decertification, but the change is small. The
bottom panel shows a large, but temporary price decrease following the decertification event.
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A.3. Average Electricity Prices
I observe the zip code of the store where the transaction occurred, not the zip code of the household.
Average annual electricity prices for each region are computed using form EIA-861 from the Energy
Information Administration (EIA 2008).
The use of average electricity prices is partly motivated by recent empirical evidence (Borenstein
2012; Ito 2014) that suggests that electricity consumers may in fact respond to variation in average
prices more so than marginal prices. In the present case, the use of average electricity prices is also
dictated by the fact that household location is not perfectly known. Therefore, it is impossible to
match households with their exact electricity tariff and infer marginal price.
Average electricity prices at the county level are computed as follows. Using form EIA-861 of the
Energy Information Administration, I compute the average residential electric price for each electric
utility operating in the United States for the year 2008. I then match electric utility territories with
each county where I sampled at least one store. For counties with only one electric utility, I use
the average electricity price for this particular utility. For counties with several electric utilities, I
take the arithmetic mean of each utility’s average price to construct the county-level price.
Appendix B. Estimation Details
To perform the estimation of the demand model, a random subsample of the transactions is used
for three different income groups. The subsample is constructed as follows.
First, the subsample is drawn from the set of transactions that fit the following criteria (the
restricted sample):
• transactions made by consumers that are homeowners;
• transactions made by consumers living in single family housing units; and
• transactions made by consumers that made no more than one refrigerator purchase during
the period 2008-2011.
45
Second, the following stratified sampling method is used to create the sub-sample. For a given
targeted sample size, I sample transactions for three different income groups:
• households with income less than $50,000;
• households with income between $50,000 and $100,000; and
• households with income more than $100,000.
B.1. Information Acquisition Model
The information acquisition is estimated via maximum likelihood. The model is initialized at the
parameter values found with the conditional logit (Model 3, Table 2). The optimization is performed
with the interior/direct algorithm implemented with the Knitro solver. Analytical gradients are
computed and provided to the solver.
The latent class model can converge to saddle points and local optima. A large number (>100)
of starting values are thus considered to initialize the optimization. The initial points are random
perturbations of the parameter values of the conditional logit. Once the optimization converges, a
spectral analysis is performed to rule out saddle points—the eigenvalues of the hessian must be all
of the same sign. Among the vectors of estimates that are not saddle points, the one that provides
the lowest objective function is selected as the optimum.
Appendix C. Estimation: Additional Interpretation and Results
Assuming that consumers form time-unvarying expectations about the yearly operating electricity
cost and do not account for the effect of depreciation, the coefficient on electricity cost is a reduced
form parameter that relates to the discount factor as follows:21
(10) θ = ηρ(1− ρ
L)
1− ρ ,






1− ρ Cj .
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where L is the lifetime of the durable, and ρ = 1/(1 + r) is the discount factor. The estimates of
η and θ can then be used to infer a value of an implicit discount rate r. Assuming a lifetime of
18 years, the implicit discount rate that rationalizes consumers’ decisions for the base specification
(Model 1, Table 2) is 80% for the lowest-income group, 39% for the medium-income group, and
22% for the highest-income group. To put these numbers into perspective, in its latest cost-benefit
analysis of minimum energy efficiency standards for refrigerators, the Department of Energy used
a product lifetime of 19 years and discount rates of 3% and 7% (DOE 2011).
Table 5. Alternative Specifications Conditional Logit: Income <$50,000
I IV V VI VII
Retail Price -0.416∗∗∗ -0.409∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ENERGY STAR 0.12∗ 0.13∗ 0.12∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Rebate 0.084∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Elec. Cost -1.295∗∗∗ -1.232∗∗∗ -1.156∗∗∗ -1.235∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23)
Product FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls: Demo × Attributes No No No No No
Brand-Week FEs No Yes No No No
Avg. Elec. Price Cty Cty State Cty Cty
Controls: Product Age No No No Yes No
Restricted Choice Set No No No No Yes
# Obs 46,097 46,097 46,097 46,097 46,097
Interpretation
Own-Price Elasticity -5.41 -5.30 -5.41 -5.41 -5.37
Implicit Discount Rate 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.55
WTP ES Label 29.68 31.01 29.96 29.94 37.99
Response to Rebate 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.18
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses: ∗ (p < 0.05),
∗∗ (p < 0.01), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.001). Prices, rebates, and electricity costs measured in
hundreds of dollars. Average price of $1,300 used to compute own-price elasticity.
Refrigerator lifetime of 18 years used to compute implicit discount rate.
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Table 6. Alternative Specifications Conditional Logit: Income ≥$50,000 &
<$100,000
I IV V VI VII
Retail Price -0.365∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ -0.365∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ENERGY STAR 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Rebate 0.042∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Elec. Cost -2.011∗∗∗ -2.044∗∗∗ -1.992∗∗∗ -2.044∗∗∗ -0.92∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24)
Product FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls: Demo × Attributes No No No No No
Brand-Week FEs No Yes No No No
Avg. Elec. Price Cty Cty State Cty Cty
Controls: Product Age No No No Yes No
Restricted Choice Set No No No No Yes
# Obs 45,487 45,487 45,487 45,487 45,487
Interpretation
Own-Price Elasticity -4.75 -4.69 -4.75 -4.75 -4.69
Implicit Discount Rate 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.39
WTP ES Label 43.98 43.51 44.48 44.59 54.66
Response to Rebate 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.14
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses: ∗ (p < 0.05),
∗∗ (p < 0.01), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.001). Prices, rebates, and electricity costs measured in
hundreds of dollars. Average price of $1,300 used to compute own-price elasticity.
Refrigerator lifetime of 18 years used to compute implicit discount rate.
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Table 7. Alternative Specifications Conditional Logit: Income ≥$100,000
I IV V VI VII
Retail Price -0.319∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ENERGY STAR 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Rebate 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.017
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Elec. Cost -2.585∗∗∗ -2.491∗∗∗ -2.591∗∗∗ -2.586∗∗∗ -1.811∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.27)
Product FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls: Demo × Attributes No No No No No
Brand-Week FEs No Yes No No No
Avg. Elec. Price Cty Cty State Cty Cty
Controls: Product Age No No No Yes No
Restricted Choice Set No No No No Yes
# Obs 45,249 45,249 45,249 45,249 45,249
Interpretation
Own-Price Elasticity -4.15 -4.07 -4.16 -4.16 -4.20
Implicit Discount Rate 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.17
WTP ES Label 55.55 59.86 56.54 56.56 61.70
Response to Rebate 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the zip code level in parentheses: ∗ (p < 0.05),
∗∗ (p < 0.01), ∗∗∗ (p < 0.001). Prices, rebates, and electricity costs measured in
hundreds of dollars. Average price of $1,300 used to compute own-price elasticity.
Refrigerator lifetime of 18 years used to compute implicit discount rate.
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Appendix D. Comparative Statics Results
Information Acquisition Costs. Consumers will collect and process more energy information
the lower the costs to do so. In particular, a consumer should always choose to be fully informed
if there are no extra costs. The present model is consistent with this intuition, whether ENERGY
STAR information is available or not.
Proposition 1. (i) Suppose that ENERGY STAR information is not available. If K(e =
U) = K(e = I), it is optimal for the consumer to select e = h.
(ii) Suppose that ENERGY STAR information is available. If K(e = U) = K(e = ES) = K(e =
I), it is optimal for the consumer to select e = I. Moreover, if K(e = U) = K(e = ES),
e = ES is strictly better than e = U for the consumer.
Proof. This is true by the fact that the expectation of the maximum of random variables is always
greater than the maximum of their expectations. In particular, consider some set of random
variables {Y1, Y2, ..., Yk}. The distribution of max1≤j≤k{Yj} (first order) stochastically dominates




Yj ] ≥ max
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{EC [Uij(δj , ηPj , Cj , εij)]}
]
.
This follows from (11) if I set
Yj ≡ Uij(δj , ηPj , Cj , εij).
This concludes the proof for (i).
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The proof for (ii) is similar.
Crowding-Out Effect. A simple, but important implication of the above result is that if the costs
of processing and collecting ENERGY STAR information are lower than the costs of searching
for energy costs, some consumers may prefer to select the maximum level of effort rather than
not collecting information at all, but could prefer a medium level of effort over a maximum one.
Formally,
Corollary 1. If K(e = ES) < K(e = I), then for some consumers
V(e = U) < V(e = I) < V(e = ES)
Proof. The proof follows directly from Proposition 1.
This formally shows that the ENERGY STAR certification induces some consumers to be less
informed and crowds out efforts to fully account for energy costs.
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Appendix E. Welfare Measure
The derivation of the welfare measure closely follows the approach of Leggett (2002). The key
difference is that in the present application the computation of indirect expected utility requires
integrating over the distributions of the idiosyncratic taste parameters, ε, and idiosyncratic infor-
mation acquisition costs, ν. Given that these two distributions are assumed to be independent, the
indirect expected utility is then simply a weighted sum of the indirect expected utility specific to





Note that the subscripts r and t are omitted to simplify the exposition. Remember that in the
present framework, consumer types are identified by e, and three types are distinguished: consumers
that are uninformed about energy use and cost (e = U), informed about ES but not local energy
operating costs (e = ES), or perfectly informed about local energy operating costs (e = I).
Leggett (2002) derives an expression for E[Ui(e)] where consumers’ perceived quality differs from
the quality actually experienced. He focuses on the case where the idiosyncratic taste parameters,
ε, are Type 1 extreme value distributed. His equations 8 and 9 (p. 348-349) show the derivations
that can readily be applied in the present context.
Under the assumption that for e = I decision utility coincides with experienced utility, we have




which is the standard log-sum formula for the Type 1 extreme value distribution where A is a
constant of integration.
The case where e = ES, UESi corresponds to the perceived utility in Leggett (2002)’s framework,
and U Ii corresponds to experienced utility. He shows that the indirect expected (experienced) utility
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if consumers make decisions relying on UESi is given by






PESij (U Iij − UESij ) +A.
For e = U , we have a similar expression:






PUij (U Iij − UUij ) +A.
Using the above expressions measured for a policy change P → P̃, we can obtain a measure of
compensating variation similar to Leggett (2002) (Equation 10, p. 349). The main difference is









































PUi (U Iij − UUij )
}.
Note that the constant of integration A cancels out from the expression only under the assump-
tion that the distribution of the idiosyncratic taste parameters, ε, is the same before and after the
policy change and across consumer types.
